911勛圖

 Callum Shaw

Callum Shaw

Job Market Candidate

Department of Economics

Connect with me

Languages
English
Key Expertise
Political Economy, Economics of Media, Industrial Organisation

About me

I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). I specialise in political economy, applied econometrics, and the economics of media. My research combines large-scale media engagement data with tools from causal inference, structural modeling, and natural language processing to study how social networks and algorithmic curation shape political polarization and the spread of misinformation. My job market paper, ‘Quantifying Echo Chambers and Their Impact on News Engagement: Evidence from a Facebook Algorithm Update’, develops new methods to measure network homophily and shows how algorithmic changes amplify tribalism and misinformation online.

Beyond academia, I have professional experience as a Data Scientist at Quantco, where I worked on algorithmic pricing models, and as an Economist at Amazon, where I applied causal inference and machine learning to e-commerce problems. I also have 3 years of work experience prior to my PhD in digital marketing and management consultancy.

Contact Information

Email
c.j.shaw@lse.ac.uk  

Office address
Department of Economics 
London School of Economics and Political Sciences
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE 
UK

Contacts and Referees

Placement Officer
Matthias Doepke

Supervisors
Martin Pesendorfer

References
Martin Pesendorfer
Department of Economics
London School of Economics and Political Sciences
Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE
m.pesendorfer@lse.ac.uk  

Ronny Razin
Department of Finance
London School of Economics and Political Sciences
Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE
r.razin@lse.ac.uk   

Thiemo Fetzer
Department of Economics
University of Warwick
Coventry, CV4 7AL
thiemo.fetzer@gmail.com

CV

 

Job Market Paper

Quantifying Echo Chambers and Their Impact on News Engagement: Evidence from a Facebook Algorithm Update

I show that social media platforms face incentives to make algorithmic design choices which amplify misinformation and polarization in news consumption – specifically, by increasing the prevalence of echo chambers. This study leverages a 2018 Facebook algorithm update to investigate how increased network homophily affects news spread in a social network. My findings support a model of news consumption on social media where rational consumers re-share news articles based on reputational concerns and a desire to spread factual news; I extend this model to analyze how network structure influences tribalism in news engagement choices. Using an empirical reworking of the model, I measure the magnitude of the increase in social network homophily caused by the algorithm update. I then use this credibly exogenous shift to test the model’s main predictions. As predicted, greater homophily increases engagement with less reliable, more divisive news, and intensifies tribalism of engagement behaviour with media via an ‘agitation bubble’ effect. The results demonstrate that echo chambers created by social media platforms can drive tribalism and misinformation, rather than merely reflecting the existing prevalence of these phenomena in society. As the algorithm update benefited the platform, the results further suggest that platform incentives in shaping network structure misalign with social welfare and clarify how the global shift toward news consumption via social media can damage news diets. This work underscores the role of the communication network structure in explaining polarization, shifting focus away from explanations based on changing beliefs or cognitive biases.

Download the paper

Publications and Working Papers

Working Papers 
Boundaries of State (2025), with T. Fetzer and J. Edenhofer [link].

Works-in-progress 
If it Bleeds, it Leads: Multivariate Firm Objectives with Concave Arguments []. 
The Impact of Social Media Bargaining on Media Market Competition []. 
Vertical Integration and Demand Steering with Information Frictions: Evidence From the Online Advertising Industry [].